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abstract 
 
Markets sit in places and knowledge produced in these 
places also constitute the very foundation of markets’ 
viability and market actors’ performative competitive 
edge. However, not all markets are created equal 
primarily in the context of their importance in the global 
economy. Thus conceived, we imagine a world economy 
or markets populated by people in front of wide 
computer screens making sense of financial algorithms 
and derivatives. In a way, here, we see a market that is 
run by codified knowledge, or scientific knowledge that 
transcends boundaries. But what about a conception of 
market that recognizes the production of knowledge in 
the periphery, and this instance, fish markets, where 
place-based knowledge marks the contours of 
engagement of fishmongers to their wider world and yet, 
concomitantly, also underscores their attachment to 
place? In this article, in an ethnographic study of four fish 
markets in a small coastal town in southern Philippine, 
fishmongers engage with market processes via their 
production and deployment of vernacular knowledge 
which is performed in the form of public specialized 
knowledge, tacit knowledge and network knowledge. In 
these forms of vernacular knowledge, we become 
cognizant of the complexities of market processes even 
in places that are relegated to the margins, where 
knowledge plays a crucial role in sensing the world and 
making it lived and real.  
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Introduction 
 
Nowadays, there are very few markets, regardless of their size 
and location, the kinds and volume of product they trade, which are 
not impacted by events and processes that take place beyond the 
confines of their geographical situatedness. On the other hand, 
markets are also rooted in places, embedded in local networks of 
relations and knowledge pools, imbibing local jibes and vibes and 
operating within circumstances that also speak about their spatio-
cultural belongingness.1 Fish markets in many parts of the world in 
so many different ways are both; they are global and local at the same 
time. In this article, however, I am interested in the local materiality 
of markets as experienced in the ways in which vernacular knowledge 
(place-based) is produced and consumed by fishmongers in four fish 
markets in a coastal town in southern Philippines.  
In recent years much has been written about fish markets and 
their embeddedness in places where they operate. For instance, 
regardless of measures to extract fish auctions, from the pull of local 
contexts (like the flow of privileged information between 
fishmongers to influence the price of fish, for example), undeniably, 
fish markets do not operate in a cocoon of purely economic relations 
and contexts, where decisions are based solely on rational and 
scientific grounds. Peterson, in describing the Honolulu fish auction, 
has shown that “non-economic factors such as the social 
relationships among bidders, different cultural cycles of holidays, and 
ethnic group species preferences affect bidding behavior and price”.2 
It also along this line that while most fish market regulations are 
structured to provide tools of the trade to all market participants to 
create an even playing field, ‘market imperfections’ like “market 
power of a group of buyers, the fishermen’s lack of information on 
the market, and the buyer’s lack of information on quality of the 
landed fish”3 continue to persist affecting and shaping market 
dynamics in many places.  
                                                          
1Stig-Erik Jakobsen, “Development of Local Capitalism in Norwegian 
Fish Farming,” Marine Policy 23, no. 2 (1999): 117-130.  
2 Susan B. Peterson, “Decisions in a Market: A Study of the Honolulu 
Fish Auction” (PhD Dissertation, University of Hawai’i, 1973), 241. 
3 Ibid., 238. 
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To highlight the emplacement of fish markets, Fluvia et al.4  
have observed that in most cases social relationships and their 
attendant social dynamics have an impact on the outcomes of fish 
trading, like the ones in Palamos and Ancona fish markets in Spain.5 
Furthermore, many studies also show markets for perishable 
products, including fish markets, contrary to what is expected, are 
characterized by patterns of behavior that may suggest imperfect 
competition and a segmented market.6 These behaviors are borne out 
of market players’ engagement with and in places where they conduct 
their business. And rather than market processes becoming 
homogenous as world goes turbo-charged towards globalisation, in 
fish markets all over the world, there are still different selling and 
buying practices which influence outcomes desired by fish traders.7  
In recent years, fish markets have undergone dramatic changes 
and this involves the digitization and use of technology in trading 
processes.8 As new technologies are introduced, this also has an 
effect on the quantity and quality of information available in the 
market. Electronic auction systems, for example, have been 
introduced as a solution to the power imbalance between buyers 
(primary processors) and sellers (fishermen) in favour of the latter. 
However, as Guillotreau observed, “the diversity of trading and 
bidding systems in use, sometimes within a single country or region, 
demonstrates that the selection of market technology is not entirely 
motivated by economic efficiency, but reveals the negotiation of the 
                                                          
4Modest Fluvia, Anna Garriga, Ricard Rigall-I-Torrent, Ernesto 
Rodríguez-Carámbula and Albert Saló, “Buyer and Seller Behavior in Fish Markets 
Organized as Dutch Auctions: Evidence from a Wholesale Fish Market in 
Southern Europe,”. Fisheries Research, no. 127-128 (2012): 18-25. 
5 Mauro Gallegati, Gianfranco Giulioni, Alan Kirman and Antonio 
Palestrini, “What’s that Got to do with the Price of Fish? Buyers Behavior on the 
Ancona Fish Market,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, no. 80 (2011): 20. 
6 Gianfranco Giulioni and Edgardo Bucciarelli, “Agents’ Ability to 
Manage Information in Centralized Markets: Comparing Two Wholesale Fish 
Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, no. 80, (2011): 34. 
7 Ilene M. Kaplan, “Seafood Auctions, Market Equity and the Buying and 
Selling of Fish: Lessons on Co-management from New England and the Spanish 
Mediterranean,” Marine Policy, no. 24, (2000): 165-177. 
8 Pedro S. Rodriguez-Hernandez, Francisco J. Gonzalez-Castaño, Jose M. 
Pousada-Carballo, Manuel J. Fernandez-Iglesias and Jaime Garcia-Reinoso, 
“Cellular Network for Real-Time Mobile Auction.” Wireless Personal Communications, 
no. 22, (2002): 23-40. 
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social structure in the market”.9 In affect, what this says is in the midst 
of purported modernization and technologisation of fish markets, 
fish markets, unavoidable, sit in places.  
In all these talks about fish markets being located in places and 
the flow of information that circulate amongst market players being 
a product of their own social and spatial situatedness, however, quite 
interestingly, one very important issue that is left unproblematized 
and underexplored and yet underpins the operations and viability of 
fish markets is the production and consumption of knowledge in 
these places of commerce. As fishermen and their knowledge of 
fishing and fish trading have been amply covered in literature,10 the 
other market player in the equation, fishmongers, their activities and 
their knowledge of the trade, have elicited limited attention in 
mainstream research. This article contributes towards filling in that 
lacuna.   
In general, this study will make a modest contribution to our 
sustained engagement with peripheral markets like the fish markets 
cited in this article and how, regardless of the perceived 
homogenization of markets across the globe as a result of 
globalization, markets are still spatially situated in specific places and 
concomitantly, markets are also very much an effect of how 
knowledge is used in these places. This article adds further 
ethnographic nuance to what we already know about fish markets in 
the context of their social embeddedness and the processes that 
attend fish trading. Fish markets considered in this article are four 
small fish markets and are very much in the margins, in so many ways, 
as they are located in a small coastal town and with a very limited 
exposure to external forces and with few market players compared to 
similar markets in other places. In a way, this is a study of markets in 
the margins and as such a contribution to understanding the 
processual dynamics of commerce in markets such as this. This is 
also about vernacular knowledge and the role it plays in markets. 
Specifically, this article examines the forms of vernacular knowledge 
                                                          
9 Patrice Guillotreau and Ramon Jimenez Toribio, “The Price Effect of 
Expanding Fish Auction markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, no. 
79, (2011): 224. 
10 See for example Jennifer F. Brewer, “Harvesting a Knowledge 
Commons: Collective Action, Transparency, and Innovation at the Portland Fish 
Exchange,” International Journal of the Commons 8, no. 1, (2014): 155-178. 
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at play in fish markets in a fishing community in the Philippines as 
they are produced and consumed by fishmongers.   
Following this introduction, the methods employed in the 
study are explained together with the description of the place where 
the study was conducted. Immediately after, a brief history and 
descriptive accounts of fish markets, and auctions in fish markets are 
presented together with a look at vernacular knowledge and its 
relation to place. The discussion part provides the ethnographic 
account of the forms of vernacular knowledge deployed by 
fishmongers in their daily transaction in fish markets. The conclusion 
provides a summation of the arguments presented earlier with regard 
to fish markets and the use of vernacular knowledge and how they 
show us the continued emplacement of markets in many different 
interesting ways.  
 
Methods 
 
This article is part of a bigger study that looked into the 
everyday life of a fishing community in the Philippines. The fieldwork 
from which the large bulk of the data used in this article took place 
in 2008-2009, July-January. Successive visits of the author to the 
community thereafter until 2015 allowed the author to add further 
empirical muscle to the article.  
There were four fish markets in the community and while some 
fishermen from the community would sell their daily landings direct 
to fishmongers, most of the fish trading took place in fish markets. 
They were all on the town’s promenade and close to the port 
although they were set apart from each other. Two of the fish 
markets had their own fleet of boats while the rest of the two relied 
mainly on the landings of local fishermen. On top of local fishermen 
living in the community, fishermen from neighboring communities 
as well as those from other towns sold their catch to these fish 
markets. In total, there were 35 fishmongers who did business in fish 
markets although not all of them would transact business in all of 
them. Some would do the rounds while others would concentrate on 
one or two fish markets only. Their reasons varied but most of the 
time their preference to transact business with any specific fish 
markets would boil down to their relationship with fish market 
owners and the volume of landing that fish markets would usually 
have. One fish markets, for instance, would only open their premises 
in the months of March to October and would close in the typhoon 
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season (November – February) as it was heavily reliant on local 
fishermen compared to other fish markets which were open the who 
year-round as their suppliers were also fishermen from other towns 
as well. Some of these fish markets would also source their fish from 
the city port in times when no fish landings were expected.  
Information were gathered through participant observation 
and unstructured interview. In total, I did fieldwork in fish markets 
for a month. The first fifteen days were used for observation.  I would 
come to fish markets at around 8:00 in the morning and leave at 5:00 
pm. As fish markets operated in different hours, I saw to it that I 
would have the time to visit the four fish markets everyday. In 
addition, as some fish markets were far busier than others, I would 
at times spend more time in one or two than others. In case (though 
very rare) all fish markets would hold auctions simultaneously (I 
would know this from the fishmongers themselves who would be 
informed via sms by fish dealers), I would choose the one which I 
did not have much information on. In my daily round of fish markets, 
I would keep myself in a corner, trying not to call attention to myself, 
while busy jotting down notes. My first days in the fish markets made 
me a curious object of attention and I had to explain myself to the 
fishmongers. At times, fish dealers (whom I talked to first to gain 
permission) were at hand to explain my presence. As time passed by, 
I became just one of them, blending in with the crowd, or like a piece 
of furniture, very much present and yet not heard especially during 
fish auctions. However, before and after fish auctions, I would join 
the banter and ask some questions with things and procedures that 
were not clear with me or needed further clarification. I started my 
formal interviews on my next 15 days and all interviews were done in 
the houses of fishmongers, fish auctioneers and fish dealers. The fish 
markets were not conducive for formal interviews and deeper 
probing of issues as they were always very busy and noisy and some 
questions could only be answered in the privacy of someone’s house. 
Interviews lasted from 30 minutes to two hours. Out of the 35 
fishmongers, four refused to be interviewed. All the fish dealers and 
fish auctioneers agreed to be interviewed and two of the fish dealers 
opened their accounts for the author to have a look at although they 
refused their annual financial statements to be photocopied.  
All interviews were audio-recorded while at the same time 
when necessary, the author also jotted down notes in the course of 
the interview to signpost interesting ideas that came into mind or as 
a way to identify follow up questions. The language used in the 
 
K N O W L E D G E  S I T S  I N  P L A C E S  
M A B I N I  R E V I E W  [ 7 2 ]  V O L U M E  5  ( 2 0 1 6 )  
interview was Filipino, the Philippine national language and the 
language used by people in the community.  
 
Fish Markets, Auction and Vernacular Knowledge  
 
Fish markets now litter most fishing communities although in 
some other places, mostly remote and with no facilities and 
infrastructural support from the national and local agencies, or no 
private investment is available, fishermen directly sell their landings 
to fishmongers who are also, most of the time, tend to be family 
members and close associates. In fish markets, auctions are the usual 
method of setting the price of fish brought in by fishermen. While 
fish markets and auction could have a much later introduction in the 
Philippines as the first and the biggest fish port and fish market in 
the country was not constructed in Manila until 1973, they have a 
much earlier genesis in other parts of the world. For instance, in 
France, their introduction in big harbours such as Boulogne sur Mer 
or Concarneau dates back to the late 19th century. In some parts of 
the US, the establishment of fish markets and use of auction took 
place much later. As recounted by Brewer, for example: 
 
Until the 1980s, most New England boats unloaded and sold 
groundfish through long-term relationships between fishing 
boat owners and small, private fish buyers….These deeply local 
relationships were especially prevalent in more remote 
harbours.11  
 
The first fish market in the town where this study took place 
was opened in 1985 although in a neighboring town which was 
known for its more developed fish port, the first fish market opened 
in the 1970s. In many parts of the world therefore, fish markets and 
auction only gained credence much later. Before then, fishermen 
would sell their landings directly to sellers and buyers.  
Fish markets vary in size and concomitantly the volume of 
landings that is sold through auction. For example, the four fish 
markets where I did my fieldwork were a relatively modest affair. 
Each of them was housed in a small if not dilapidated building which 
could occupy not more than 10 people and 10 boxes of fish at a time. 
Although I was not given by owners any figure of their combined 
fish landings and earnings (they were wary that the information they 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 160. 
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would supply me might land in the revenue district officer’s desk), I 
estimated that each of them would have a gross sale of not more than 
P 2 million annually. Compared these fish markets to Tsukiji, the 
world’s largest market for fresh and frozen seafood. This is a 
marketplace where 60,000 traders come each day to buy and sell 
seafood for Tokyo’s 22 million mouths, where every day over 2.4 
million kilograms of seafood changes hands.12  
We can attribute the establishment of fish markets where 
fishermen and fishmongers could come together and maximize the 
economic rent of fish to the increase in demands for fish as source 
of protein and also an effect of cities and towns being host to a bigger 
number of workers as the push for industrialization and 
modernization of economies gathered pace in many places. Along 
the same line, it also paved the way for an increased exposure of 
fishing communities to the market economy. Markets such as this are 
seen to provide the necessary space and opportunity for competitive 
markets to flourish. The most powerful argument in favor of 
perfectly competitive markets is that in the long run they supply the 
quantity and quality of products which consumers demand at a price 
equal to minimum average cost of production.13  
Concomitant with the formalization of fish markets as a 
necessary fixture to any fishing community aiming to maximize the 
value of fish as commodity, auctions became the preferred way to 
settle the price of fish in the market between the seller and the buyer. 
Auctions would likely generate mechanism for solving the 
information problem, such as prior inspection of the product or trust.  
Auction is the marketised embodiment of rationalized pricing 
as it tried to do away with the influence of extra-market forces to 
determine the price of commodity. In a way, by putting fish on 
auction, the logic of the market prevails. As a modernist way to do 
market, auctions are conceived as a manifestation of objectivist 
knowledge materialized as it “eliminate(s) all social influences over 
knowledge creation and in so doing determine the ‘true’ nature of the 
                                                          
12 Theodore C. Bestor, “Supply-Side Sushi: Commodity, Market, and the 
Global City,” American Anthropologist 103, no. 1, (2001): 84. 
13 Susan Peterson and Samuel Georgianna, “New Bedford’s Fish Auction: 
A Study in Auction Method and Market Power,” Human Organization 47, no. 3 
(1988): 235. 
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world outside of the individual mind”.14 Through auction, people 
would use their reason and the information that they have to compete 
for goods. Everything would be transparent, rationalised and 
numericalised.  
However, auctions are not just about the recalibration of 
market processes since coupled with these transformations are 
changes in people’s behavior, habits and attitude towards 
information gathering, and the ways people valorize certain methods 
of doing things over others, the very exercise of knowledge 
production and consumption. In a way, no matter which label one 
prefers, the production, acquisition, absorption, reproduction, and 
dissemination of knowledge is seen by many as the fundamental 
characteristics of contemporary competitive dynamics.15 As Brewer 
explained:  
When a centralized, regional auction co-organised by fishers 
and civic interests replaced local ex-vessel fish buyers, it 
precipitated subsequent changes along the market chain from 
harvest to consumption, and raised the economic value of 
industry knowledge. By extricating initial product sales from 
dense and multivalent social relations long entrained by 
undifferentiated commodity markets and localist dependencies, 
it provided a newly transparent and information-rich arena in 
which a wider range of differentiated product standards could 
arise and compete.16 
 
However, though auctions are supposed to level the playing 
field, with all possible information ready for consumption and 
evaluation by market players, there are other things that get in the 
way for perfect competition to take place. Buyers or sellers may be 
restricted from entering auction, and trading may take place outside 
the auction. Within the auction, sellers and buyers can form coalition 
to rig bid prices. Central meeting places and the appearance of 
fairness can be useful settings for opportunistic behavior. The rules 
                                                          
14 Nigel Curry and James Kirwan, “The Role of Tacit Knowledge in 
Developing Networks for Sustainable Agriculture,” Sociologia Ruralis 54, no. 3 
(2014): 345. 
15 Meric S. Gertler, “Tacit Knowledge and the Economic Geography of 
Context, or the Undefinable Tacitness of Being (there),” Journal of Economic 
Geography 3, (2003): 76. 
16 Jennifer F. Brewer, “Harvesting a Knowledge Commons,” 158. 
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of the auction can cause problems even when bidding is 
competitive.17  
This tells us how the rationalities of market are also about the 
people’s own negotiation of what appeals to them and what engages 
them, in a way, what brings them better return regardless of the 
method or the ethos that attends them. The knowledge that they use 
in achieving these ends is therefore generated and deployed in a given 
time-space envelope. Indeed, all knowledge is both performative and 
representational. It is historical, contingent and is coproduced with 
society.18 It is along this line that fish markets are a good place to 
explore the different ways in which vernacular knowledge is 
articulated in pursuit of market ends. 
Vernacular knowledge, as deployed in this article, refers to 
place-based knowledge. I am cognizant of other possible variants to 
the concept, local and indigenous knowledge being the most popular 
and discussed in literature. However, as Bartel notes, the use of 
vernacular knowledge is most appropriate when there is a need to 
underscore the role that place plays in the production of knowledge:  
 
Vernacular knowledge includes both biophysical and social and 
cultural phenomena. It derives from places, and produces 
places. Vernacular knowledge is knowledge gained not via 
theory and not just through practice, but practice-in-place.19  
 
In a way, this also brings into the equation the role and 
importance of place in understanding knowledge productions in 
marginal places and as such places where a vernacular expression of 
market logic is most apparent. Vernacular knowledge then is a 
concept that recognizes that setting is not inert and that place is active 
and has agency.20 
In placing vernacular knowledge at the centre of market 
processes in the fish markets under consideration, the article also 
recognizes the active role that fishmongers perform in making sense 
of their relations to the people around them, the public events and 
occasions that punctuate the tenor of their working lives and the flow 
                                                          
17 Peterson and Georgianna, “New Bedford’s Fish Auction: A Study in 
Auction Method and Market Power,” 236. 
18 David Turnbull, “Reframing Science and Other Local Knowledge 
Traditions,” Futures 29, no. 6, (1997): 553. 
19 Robyn Bartel, “Vernacular Knowledge and Environmental Law: Cause 
and Cure for Regulatory Failure,” Local Enviroment 19, no. 8 (2014): 893. 
20 Ibid. 
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of information relevant to their trade. Places beget knowledge and 
knowledge vernacularise places in return.  
The performativity of vernacular knowledge in fish markers 
takes three forms: public specialized; tacit and network knowledge. 
As will be shown in this article, there are different facets to vernacular 
knowledge and by looking at them, we will be able to present 
vernacular knowledge as a contingent combination of information, 
skills and capacities, constituted within and responsive to the 
specificities of the place.21 This helps in rendering more nuanced and 
ethnographically clear the epistemological richness of markets in the 
context of how knowledge is produced and consumed in places.   
 
Public Specialised, Tacit and Network Knowledge: Markets 
Sit in Places 
 
An uninitiated in fish markets would have a casual description 
on how auctions are done and on my first day in one of the fish 
markets, this is what I wrote in my notebook: 
 
Once the four boxes of fish are opened, the gathered 
fishmongers swarmed around them and for several minutes 
they went around them, like in a dance, eyeing the boxes, 
intently. One fishmonger dipped his hand into the open box 
and stayed there for a second, feeling the density of fish inside. 
Another fished out several pieces and examined them. When I 
asked about the weight of each of the boxes, I was told that no 
one knew. They had to guess. It’s part of the auction process. 
Soon, the auctioneer asked the fishmongers to submit their bid. 
One by one, they went up to her and whispered into her ear 
their bid. When all was done, the auctioneer conferred with the 
fisherman who brought in the boxes of fish. I was told she was 
asking him if he would accept the amount of the winning bid. 
Apparently he did because in a matter of seconds, the winner 
was announced.  
 
The auction looked so simple and easy. However, what was 
going on in the minds of the fishmongers as they were preparing their 
bid could be an entirely different matter. So many questions could be 
                                                          
21Andrew Wilbur, “Cultivating Back-to-the-Landers: Networks of 
Knowledge in Rural Northern Italy,” Sociologia Ruralis 54 no. 2 (2013): 170. 
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asked but the most important is: What could be the best price for the 
boxes of fish wherein a good return could be had?  
While putting in a bid is no exact science, in my days in the fish 
markets, I was able to identify three types of vernacular knowledge 
at work in every auction that was taking place. The first one is all 
about the deployment of public specialised knowledge. This form of 
knowledge refers to all the publicly available and accessible 
information that fishmongers must know and have in their pursuit of 
a most appropriate bid, appropriate in the sense that the bid must be 
high enough to be competitive and yet not too high enough to incur 
a good return. These information is available to everyone though only 
those who are into fish trading would be most likely to be interested 
to acquire and meticulously keep track of these information. As such, 
they are public and yet specialised since while everyone is free to 
acquire them, their acquisition takes time and effort and only 
fishmongers would be willing to spend time and energy mastering 
them. In what follows below, I list down some of these information:  
 
Quality of fish: 
 
If the eyes of the fish is red, it is not fresh anymore 
If the gills are red, the fish is in a good condition. 
If the flesh is soft and not firm, then it will not last for more 
than a day  
If the fish is properly packed in a box full of ice, and the eyes 
are not red and the flesh is firm, the fish will last for two-three days 
more  
Buyer has to check the stomach if it is still intact or innards are 
starting to come out (fishmongers refer to this state of fish as 
‘nagtatae’, or ‘shitting’), if it’s the latter then it is in a bad state 
 
Size of fish 
 
Small size means a lower price 
Medium means a premium price 
Big size means a lower price 
 
Availability of fish in the market 
 
If there is a big volume of the same species being sold in the 
market the price is greatly reduced 
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Availability of different species in the market 
 
There is a hierarchy of fish species in the market in terms of 
people’s preference. So if two species are landed and come in huge 
quantity, the most popular one becomes more expensive over the 
other.  
 
Supply of fish in the market 
If there is a low supply of fish in the market and what is 
available are mostly cultured varieties like milk fish and tilapia, the 
usual cheapest varieties of caught fish becomes ‘gold’ and thus, 
buyers must maximise this opportunity. If there is an abundant 
supply of different types of fish however, one has to know the most 
popular or preferred types by consumers as they are a bit more 
expensive than others. However, certain fish varieties, the premium 
ones, like snapper, hold their price regardless of the volume of supply 
of other varieties of fish in the market but command an even better 
price if their supply is low.  
 
Fish price biography 
 
Buyers should always keep abreast of the fish’s price history at 
least for the preceeding week to have a handle of the fish’ average 
and ‘regular’ price 
 
Town’s calendar of events and other public occasions 
 
Public events affect the price of fish in the market as this also 
drives up consumption. Events like Easter break is usually known to 
drive the price of fish up as people tend to consume fish rather than 
meat and not many fishermen go out to fish. Buyers should also have 
an ear for big private events since this could also have an impact on 
the prices of premium varieties of fish.  
 
Other considerations 
 
If a particular fish which is unknown in town is landed, its price 
will depend on its closest fish type.  
In so many ways, fishmongers should have a knowledge of all 
these information to be able to weigh properly the best tactic possible 
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to approach a particular type of fish up for auction. However, mere 
acquisition of these knowledge is not enough. How one makes sense 
of them all, trying to figure out what particular information is more 
salient than others matters. In addition, some information are still 
subject to the fishmonger’s own personal interpretation. For 
example, when it comes to the constitution of the fish, whether it’s 
soft or firm is still very much subjective. For an untrained eye, all 
fish’s flesh could be soft but for those who had been in the business 
for many years, they could easily decide and make an outright clear-
cut evaluation whether a particular fish is firm to the touch or soft 
which would have an impact on its longevity in the market and 
therefore its price. And there are different degrees to being soft, I 
soon found out. Some fish’ flesh could be soft but could still be sold 
for a number of hours in the market before they get stale. In a way, 
there is a particular shelf life to this quality of fish and there is always 
a different way to feel it. One good example is when Lou won a box 
of fish. One of the fishmongers who lost to her told me:  
 
May angur yang si Lou. Malambot na ang isda ang taas pa ang 
bulong. Bukas sira na yan, tatae na. Malulugi pa s’ya.  
 
Rather puzzled by his observation, I asked Lou about the fish 
quality and he told me that it was okay, the flesh was firm. I was left 
wondering about their divergent opinion. This however proves that 
regardless of the public nature of these information, there are some 
facts that depend much on the personal evaluation of fishmongers.  
However, bids submitted should not be competitive only, they 
should also be calibrated properly to make profit. I had been told a 
number of stories where fishmongers got their number so wrong that 
they ended up incurring huge losses. A number of them had been 
hauled to the local court to force them to pay up while others were 
barred from fish markets until the time they were able to meet their 
commitments. One that I met had to stop from sending her only 
daughter to a private college in the city to be able to raise the required 
money to pay her debt. In the four fish markets, she could only 
transact business in one because of her unpaid debts in the remaining 
three fish markets.  
One crucial task in coming up with a competitive and yet 
profitable bid is the ability to guess the approximate weight of the 
box of fish being auctioned and this is a difficult task. Years of 
participation in auction does not guarantee the ability to properly 
 
K N O W L E D G E  S I T S  I N  P L A C E S  
M A B I N I  R E V I E W  [ 8 0 ]  V O L U M E  5  ( 2 0 1 6 )  
assess the weight of a box of fish. A fishmonger with a knack for it 
would not err by more than five kilos more or less the actual weight 
of the box of fish. For example, if the total weight of a box of fish is 
50 kilos, his ‘computation’ should not be less than 45 or more than 
55. Guessing a figure which is less than five of the actual weight while 
promising a much better profit could lessen the competitive edge of 
the fishmonger as this dramatically reduces the amount of his bid. 
On the other hand, making a guess which is more than five kilos the 
actual weight could also prove disastrous as this could translate to 
lesser profit or worse, a big loss. Thus, the imperative here is to 
minimise the margin of error on both sides of the equation and doing 
so is not an easy task. On this ‘talent’, this knack for guessing the 
weight of a box of fish, some fishmongers seemed to be better than 
others.  
This type of knowledge falls under tacit knowledge. As one of 
the great commentators of this type of knowledge explains, tacit 
knowledge is that which derives from experience and intuition and 
through shared experience. As such, it is often difficult to translate 
into rational language because it derives from a context, or a set of 
cultural rules. Furthermore, tacit knowledge cannot be overtly 
learned. It has to be experienced and assimilated rather than simply 
passed on.22 Out of the 35 fishmongers that I met and interacted with 
in the field, only four were deemed to have the ‘talent’ to guess with 
a very small margin of error the actual weight of a box of fish. Two 
were in their 50s and had been selling fish for almost 30 years, the 
other one was in his 40s and was into fish trading for close to 10 years 
while the last one was in her 30s and selling fish for only three years. 
The ‘talent’ of the first two could be possibly attributed to long years 
of exposure to the trade. However, many fishmongers had more than 
20 years of experience and yet could not do better than the people I 
cited.  
Fishmongers who were good at it could not point a finger on 
how they could do this. A fishmonger who had a talent for this said: 
 
Hirap ipaliwanag ay. Basta pag tiningnan ko tapos nacheck 
ko ang box kung anong hitsura at nacheck ko ang loob, 
matatantya ko na ang laman. Tapos medyo aangatin ko, yung 
bang bigat ay nakukuha ko dahil parang nararamdaman ko. 
                                                          
22 Nigel Curry and James Kirwan, “The Role of Tacit Knowledge in 
Developing Networks for Sustainable Agriculture,” 345. 
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Fishmongers who did not have this ‘talent’ could only say that 
these fishmongers are “magaling sa simbiran”, “simbiran” in the local 
language means guessing the weight of something. No one in the fish 
market could offer any rational explanation aside from saying that 
these fishmongers had the ‘talent’ to guess close to the real weight of 
the box. 
Based on my field observation, these four fishmongers were 
almost always very close to guessing the weight of any box of fish 
although in some instances, they would also err. For example, most 
of time these four fishmongers would only have a margin of error of 
2-4 kilos on average, compared to other fishmongers whose guess 
could go as far as 10 kilos more or less than the actual weight of the 
box of fish. However, having this special ability is not a guarantee 
that auctions could be won outright. It could provide an edge but did 
not guarantee success in any auction. Nonetheless, such ‘talent’ is 
very helpful in preventing fishmongers from incurring big losses as 
they would not submit inflated bid compared to others. 
There is one form of vernacular knowledge, however, which is 
highly selective and secretive. I would call it network knowledge or 
the knowledge that comes from one’s social network. This 
knowledge comes in the form of one’s association with people. 
Further elaborations are needed here.  
In relation to information, after all other considerations, one’s 
bid could also be influenced by extra information known only to the 
fishmonger via her close association with other people. For example, 
one could submit a relatively high bid for a kind of fish if the 
fishmonger is told that the fish could command a good price in other 
places or there is a particular demand for this kind of fish by someone 
who is willing to pay a good price for it. It could also be the case that 
a fishmonger had a customer who was willing to pay a good price for 
a kind of fish. Such information of course was not available to others 
and therefore they could me more timid and subdued in their bid.  
However, network knowledge is not just about information 
derived from close associates or relations. Network knowledge could 
also be about obtaining favours from those who are involved in the 
auctions themselves. In a way, this kind of knowledge is all about 
who one knows and as such the kind of arrangement that could be 
had in such kind of social network. In this instance, having network 
knowledge could translate to the rigging of results in favour of a 
particular fishmonger.  
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Bidding though thought to be following certain rules and 
conducted in the presence of many people is open to manipulation. 
In a number of auction houses (not fish markets though) studied by 
Smith, he speaks of how bids are rigged by the participants 
themselves. One of them is called a pool bid. Professional buyers may 
enter into collusive practices of their own, known as “pools” and 
“rings”. In such cases, in order to buy a particular item at the lowest 
possible price, a group of professional buyers agree not to bid against 
each other. They rather select one of their members to bid against 
any nonpool- members and then hold their own private auction later. 
These private auctions are called knockout auctions.23 
In the case of fish markets mentioned in this article, the rigging 
of bids was done differently. Fishmongers did not make a pool bid. 
They acted independently of one another. Furthermore, whereas in 
cases cited by Smith, the auctioneer was not involved in any form of 
chicanery, in the case of fish markets, the auctioneer plays a big part. 
Without her consent, no rigging would take place. As previously 
mentioned, however, relations between the auctioneer and the 
participating fishmonger should be intimate enough so as to secure 
unshakeable trust in one another. In a way, one’s network or who 
one knows makes it possible.24 
Though I was told that the practice is not widespread, and in 
fact I was only able to confirm two fishmongers who were doing it 
(out of 35), the fact that it was being done points to the utilisation of 
a particular form of knowledge which is illicit in many respects. The 
way to do it is to make an arrangement with an auctioneer wherein at 
least an auction could be arranged to be won by a particular 
fishmonger. This could only be done if the fishmonger had a long 
standing close relationship with the auctioneer. The rigging goes like 
this. 
Once all the bids had been communicated to the auctioneer, 
and after the winning bid was accepted by the fisherman (or owner 
of the boat that brought the fish), the fishmonger concerned who 
arranged the rigging would be proclaimed winner regardless whether 
he submitted the highest bid or not. What the auctioneer would do 
is to add an amount, usually between 100-200 PhP to the winning bid 
and proclaimed it to be the bid of this particular fishmonger. Thus, 
for example, if the actual winning bid was 3,000.00 PhP, it would 
                                                          
23 Charles W. Smith, Auctions: The Social Construction of Value (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 70. 
24Ibid., 70, 91-93, 98, 125. 
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become 3,200.00 PhP or less, as long as it was more than the winning 
bid. This kind of set-up would be arranged a day or early morning 
before the actual auction. The auctioneer would inform the 
fishmonger how many auctions were expected that day. In some 
instances when knowing the actual volume or species of fish would 
be impossible, on the actual auction itself, the fishmonger would send 
an SMS to the auctioneer detailing her preferred fish. Usually, not to 
attract suspicion from other fishmongers, there would only be one 
case of an arranged auction. If there would be six boxes of fish for 
auction, one box would already be marked for the fishmonger 
concerned. In all this, in return, the auctioneer would get 200-300.00 
for every case of rigging (which would translate to once a day) from 
the fishmonger. In some cases, the auctioneer could ask for an 
advance, say, 2,000.00 PhP which would ensure the fishmonger a 
series of winning bids for several days.  
In these two examples, the social network of the fishmongers 
allowed them to execute arrangements to their own advantage. Thus, 
one’s membership in a social network has become a ‘knowledge’ on 
how to make money in fish trading. As mentioned earlier, not 
everyone would have the opportunity to be involved in such 
arrangements as they needed trust between people. Such trust could 
only be gained through years of social intimacies which a few could 
only afford to have and enjoy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Central to my discussion is the importance of fish markets as 
fulcrum of knowledge used in the daily affairs of fishmongers, 
fishermen and fish traders as they make sense of their place in the 
local economy. Assessment and assimilation of newly received 
information, the reframing and integration of observations into 
useful knowledge, were further enabled by the more public spaces in 
which burgeoning business activities transpired. Conversations that 
once took place only on small boats, and in private spaces of shore 
side fish houses, homes, and pickup trucks expanded into largely 
public locales, enabling a much freer exchange.25 Like money, 
markets can convey noneconomic values rather than efface them. 
Spiritual practices and political relations mediate markets on the 
capitalist periphery. In short, capitalism’s most fundamental forms 
                                                          
25 Brewer, “Harvesting a Knowledge Commons,” 173. 
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are vulnerable to us. We can saturate them with our anxieties, 
fetishes, and fictions and structure them with our political practice.26 
As centre of knowledge production and consumption, the fish 
markets stand as the fishing community’s emblem and connection to 
modernity. As knowledge knows no boundaries and as information 
travel, the fish markets serve as the people’s expressed affinity to the 
wider world, to facts and figures that matter to their daily lives which 
are also very much a product of the outside world – of places, far and 
away. In their daily interaction, fishmongers have enacted ways to 
negotiate their precarious state in a place that is both peripheral and 
at the mercy of nature – fishing is very much dependent on weather 
condition. As everyone competes with everyone in staking their small 
portion in the available resources in the community, they have 
created a pool of knowledge that they get to deploy in their quest for 
a living. It is also in this sense that fishmongers have enacted their 
modern selves. 
Nowadays it has become common place to refer to the global 
economy as predominantly knowledge economy and as such our 
vision of the world is inundated with workers solving and creating 
formulae that underpin the foundations of global wealth creation. We 
have this vision of people in smart suits in front of wide screens 
tinkering with numbers and concepts that deal with market 
derivatives and software programs, amongst many. However, 
knowledge economy should not be limited to such work regime and 
market actors, otherwise, such highly specialised and constraining 
conception of knowledge will result in the marginalisation and 
trivialisation of other types of knowledges and work places and their 
contribution to global economic developments. Corollary with this, 
and in recent years, the importance of other types of knowledge, 
most notably local knowledge, as they are incorporated and 
recognised in policy documents and academic studies has signalled 
the recuperation of the will of the people from the margins and their 
active engagement with the world. In a way, as much as knowledge 
economy is about people with universal and technical know-how of 
how market derivatives affect the ebb and flow of interest rates in 
various places, it is also about place-based knowledge, the more 
limited and constrained expression of people as a response to the 
                                                          
26 Aaron Ansell, “Auctioning Patronage in Northeast Brazil: The Political 
Value of Money in a Ritual Market,” American Anthropologist 112 no. 2 (2010): 283. 
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demands of everyday life. The habituated practices of formal science 
tend toward universal or translocal explanations and applications, 
whereas local knowledge may apprehend such phenomena within a 
particular and contingent range of causative, practical and 
cosmological possibilities.27 
As premium is put on knowledge economy, there should also 
be a continuous excavation in peripheral places of what and how 
knowledge makes these places work and thrive. As shown in this 
article, there is a need to re-evaluate our understanding of peripheral 
markets such as fish markets considered in this article as they signify 
the richness of place and how in so many ways knowledge sits in 
places and markets typify this given. As evinced by the people 
involved in the daily operations of fish markets, the vernacular 
knowledge that they have evolved and deputised is, as it were, a many 
splendored thing, as it involves an array of information for evaluation 
and execution.  
 
In setting out a more nuanced understanding of the 
complexities of knowledge produced and at work in fish markets, we 
saw how fishmongers made use of publicly available knowledge on 
the social biography of fish, immersing themselves in facts and data 
that allow them to make judicious assessment in fish trading. Such 
hoard of data, complex in their own terms, alert us to the richness of 
vernacular knowledge in fish markets. On the other hand, with 
similarities to other work places, fishmongers were able to develop 
their own ways of appraising the weight of fish for auction. Tacit 
refers to embodied capabilities that defy formalization and 
explication.28 This knowledge can’t be transferred and is unique to 
individual fishmonger. Some of them were able to develop this eye 
for mathematical accuracy of assessing fish weight through years and 
years of participation in and exposure to fish trading. However, long 
years of being a fishmonger does not guarantee the acquisition of 
such tacit knowledge and also the way to winning auctions. Such 
accuracy in prediction helps in avoiding a bloated bid which could 
result in financial losses for the fishmonger concerned. The ability to 
                                                          
27 Wilbur, “Cultivating Back-to-the-Landers: Networks of Knowledge in 
Rural Northern Italy,” 169. 
 
28 Ibid., 170. 
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tap into the advantages and benefits of one’s social network, on the 
other hand, enables some fishmongers to turn their social 
relationships into financial gain. In a way, as shown by this article, 
chicaneries could be performed for the purpose of monetary 
accumulation through the exploitation of social affinities. Not 
everyone had this opportunity as some could have chosen not to or 
others did not have the same network that would enable them to 
engage in such illicit activities.  
This article therefore contributes to our understanding of local 
economies in developing countries. It is also an exercise in 
highlighting the territoriality of market forces and the adaptability of 
people who make use of them.29 It is a contribution to the burgeoning 
literature on the geographical situatedness of knowledge like how 
knowledge is deployed and put into action in certain places and 
context and how such forces are received and fashioned in different 
ways in different locales at different depths and degrees of 
commitment and involvement by people on the ground. How 
knowledge plays a crucial role in facilitating the daily affairs of a 
peripheral market compels us to pay close attention to the robust 
domestic informal economy of the fishing community studied and 
contributes to its further articulation as a rich domain of knowledge 
production.  
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